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Abstract: Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) operations have outpaced current train-
ing regimes resulting in a shortage of qualiied UAS pilots. Three potential UAS 
operator groups were explored for suitability (i.e. video game players [VGP]; private 
pilots; professional pilots) and examined to assess levels of accuracy, conidence and 
conidence-accuracy judgements (W-S C-A) during a simulated civilian cargo light. 
Sixty participants made 21 decision tasks, which varied across three levels of danger/
risk. Scales of Tolerance of Ambiguity, Decision Style and NEO-PIR were also complet-
ed. Professional pilots and VGPs exhibited the highest level of decision conidence, 
with VGPs maintaining a constant and positive W-S C-A relationship across decision 
danger/risk. As decision danger/risk increased, conidence, accuracy and W-S C-A 
decreased. Decision danger also had a role to play in the conidence expressed when 
choosing to intervene or rely on automation. Neuroticism was negatively related, and 
conscientiousness positively related, to conidence. Intolerance of ambiguity was 
negatively related to W-S C-A. All groups showed higher levels of decision conidence 
in decisions controlled by the UAS in comparison to decisions where the opera-
tor manually intervened. VGPs display less overconidence in decision judgements. 
Findings support the idea that VGPs could be considered a resource in UAS operation.
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1. Introduction
Automation is the allocation of functions to machines that have in the past been executed by hu-
mans; the term is also used to refer to machines that perform, partially or fully, those functions (Funk 
et al., 1999). The move to signiicant automation has been a feature of aviation over the last 40 years. 
As such, the term automation captures a complex blend of technology interacting with human op-
erators and carrying out a wide range of tasks (Civil Aviation Authority, 2016). From the removal of 
the light engineer from the cockpit whose function is now carried out by sophisticated full authority 
digital engine control (FADEC) computers to the advanced stabilisation, guidance and navigation 
functions of modern aircraft light control systems (FCS), the role of the crew in the cockpit has been 
transformed from “seat-of-the-pants” aviators to being the monitors of those systems to check that 
they are functioning correctly. This function is considered to be so important that it warranted a 
study of its own by the UK regulator and airline industries (Civil Aviation Authority, 2013). The rapid 
development of automated technologies has moved the world of work and systems into emergent 
automation innovation challenges. The introduction of automation, to what are now referred to as 
“glass cockpits”, provides numerous beneits, including increased vehicle trajectory precision 
(Murnaw, Sarter, & Wickens, 2001) and reduced crew workload. These beneits mainly manifest 
themselves in tasks that do not require the crew to be involved. However, when collaboration and 
cooperation between the crew and the automated system is required, problems can occur (Woods 
& Sarter, 2000). One key issue is that crews can become confused about the state and/or behaviour 
of the automation (Sarter & Woods, 1994, 1995). This can have fatal consequences, as demon-
strated in the AF447 disaster when three highly trained pilots were unable to identify that their air-
craft was in a stall condition—a basic skill taught at the earliest stages of pilot training—at least 
partially because of the information from the aircraft’s systems available to them (Bureau d’Enquêtes 
et d’Analyses, 2012). Crews can also become complacent about the ability of automation and fail to 
detect failures in the automatic systems (Parasuruman, Molloy, & Singh, 2009).
The challenges are most acute where the correct functioning of automatic systems is safety-crit-
ical. For example, many of the basic in-light functions are carried out automatically with the crew 
monitoring the health of these functions, and ready to step in should any of them be identiied as 
not performing correctly. The challenge of carrying out this supervisory task increases manifold 
when the crew are removed from the cockpit. The human loses vital sensory information (for exam-
ple, engine pitch can be used as a surrogate for engine health or even thrust demand), whilst the 
aircraft loses a very powerful sensor and information processor. However, this is the very situation 
that unmanned aerial system (UAS) operators ind themselves in when supervising typical missions 
for these vehicles. The supervisory task and assessment of the suitability of potential UAS operators 
thereby forms the basis of this paper.
A UAS can be deined as a powered vehicle that does not carry a human operator, can be operated 
autonomously or remotely, can be expendable or recoverable and can carry a lethal or nonlethal 
payload (Department of Defense, 2007). Since the 1970s aviation automation technology has prolif-
erated. This has undoubtedly contributed to the continued excellent safety record enjoyed by air 
travel. However, with new technologies emerge new problems. For example, there has been a cor-
responding increase in errors caused by human–automation interaction; that is, human error 
(Prinzel, DeVries, Freeman, & Mikulka, 2001).
It has been recognised that UASs, and in particular, those that have the capability to make certain 
high-order decisions independently (this agent will be referred to hereafter as “The Executive”), can 
reduce life cycle cost and serve as a force multiplier within the military and civilian world (Ruf, 
Calhoun, Draper, Fontejon, & Guilfoos, 2004). The success and growth in the use of automation and 
UASs does not eliminate humans from the system—instead it transforms the human role from 
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operator to supervisor. Such transformation means that the workload of the human supervisor is not 
necessarily reduced but instead requires cognitive resource and skills to be applied across a diferent 
set of tasks. For example, anticipating and understanding the automation (Walliser, 2011) to ensure 
the UAS is free from errors and efectively take control of malfunctions, if necessary (Ross, Szalma, 
Hancock, Barnett, & Taylor, 2008). Supervisors are thereby responsible for the allocation of functions 
between automatic and manual control and whether the supervisor chooses to control the system 
automatically or manually can have an impact on the performance of the system (Lee & Moray, 
1992). Human interaction is thus an integral part of UAS operations as part of the human–machine 
cooperative (Drury & Scott, 2008). However, it is anticipated that the beneits gained through the use 
of UASs can be increased through reductions in supervisor-system ratio and multiple UASs moni-
tored by one supervisor (Ruf et al., 2004). Automated systems coupled with the desire to operate 
them in ever-greater numbers with fewer supervisors demands close examination of the human–
machine relationship (Cring & Lenfestey, 2009).
One factor that may inluence the eicacy of supervision is that of trust; perhaps one of the most 
important factors that enables automated systems to be used to their full potential (Lee & Moray, 
1992). Trust in automation has been deined as the extent to which the supervisor is conident in and 
accurately willing to act on the basis of the recommendations, actions and decision of an artiicially 
intelligent agent (the UAS Executive; Madsen & Gregor, 2000). Furthermore, trust has been charac-
terised as “the attitude that an agent (the UAS Executive) will help achieve an individual’s (supervi-
sor’s) goals in a situation characterised by uncertainty” (Lee & See, 2004, p. 51). This can be explained 
by the suggestion that a relationship embodied in trust leads to the efective use of resources, ei-
cient cooperation and improved communication (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), while distrust produces an 
opposite conceptual framework (Toma & Butera, 2009; see also Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Yet, what is discussed less is the necessary concordance between a supervisor’s own level of trust 
and conidence in decisions as they relate to accuracy. We will return to this point later. Ultimately, 
the capabilities and limitations of the UAS need to be understood in order that supervisors can ef-
fectively recognise and intervene when automation capabilities have been exceeded (Cring & 
Lenfestey, 2009). Accordingly, Lee and See’s (2004) Appropriate Trust Framework states that trust 
calibration is essential for achieving appropriate dependence (i.e. where trust calibration refers to 
the match between the supervisor’s level of trust in the automation and the automated aid’s capa-
bilities). If a supervisor’s trust does not equal the true capabilities of the system then this may result 
in di culties. For example, (a) in misuse (e.g. using it when it should not be used), (b) in an overreli-
ance on the automation (e.g. paying less attention to important information) or (c) in disuse, such as 
the underuse of automation (e.g. ignoring alarms, turning of automated safety systems; 
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
The fatal consequences of the misuse of automation are evident from the crash of Eastern Flight 
401 in the Florida Everglades—due to the crew’s failure to notice the disengagement of the autopilot 
and their poor monitoring of the aircraft’s altitude (National Transportation Safety Board, 1973). 
Similarly, the consequences of the disuse of automation can be observed in the crash of Air France 
AF447 in 2009—due to pilot error when the automatic Stall Warner was ignored because of conlict-
ing air speed readings due to icing of the aircraft’s air data system (Martins & Soares, 2012). These 
catastrophic situations demonstrate the importance of the operator’s need to have appropriate con-
idence and trust in the automation available to them. However, these examples relate to accidents 
when the pilots were on board the aircraft. The issue becomes more relevant when a UAS is involved 
as the supervisor lacks the proprioceptive cues available to pilots of manned aircraft (e.g. changes in 
engine noise or vibration that can indicate possible engine malfunctions, Drury & Scott, 2008). 
Indeed, Tvaryanas, Thompson, and Constable (2005) have showed a signiicant number (n = 271) of 
UAS mishaps have occurred in the last decade due to human factors. Further, an analysis of 16 UAS 
accidents by Glussich and Histon (2010) showed, in many instances, common human deiciencies 
directly contributed to the loss of control of the automation and the aircraft.
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The framework of automation use by Dzindolet, Beck, Pierce, and Dawe (2001) predicts that cogni-
tive, motivational and social processes work together to cause misuse, disuse and inappropriate trust 
in automation and, indeed, many factors may afect each of these processes impacting upon auto-
mation use. When forming trust judgements, supervisors of automated functions compare the per-
ceived reliability of the automated aid to the reliability of manual operation in order to determine the 
perceived utility of the aid and the level of automation trust. If the perceived utility of the aid is high, 
trust in the automation is likely to be high and dependence on the automation expected. Conversely, 
if the perceived utility is low, trust will also be low and so self-reliance expected. Cognitive biases can 
impact upon the use of automation. For example, the number of tasks to be performed, intrinsic in-
terest in the task, cognitive overhead, penalties for failure and rewards for completion, and so on, will 
afect the efort a supervisor will expend on any task and the likelihood of reliance on the automated 
aid. However, Lee and See (2004) found that high levels of trust in automation do not always result 
in misuse as long as the trust is appropriate. In support of this, individuals with high levels of trust in 
automation were more successful at detecting automation failure than those with low levels of trust. 
Furthermore, the self-conidence of a supervisor signiicantly inluences how they interact with auto-
mation and the degree of trust instilled in it (Lee & Moray, 1992; Riley, 1994; Will, 1991). Individual’s 
use and trust automation more when their conidence in own ability is lower than in automation, and 
vice-versa (Lee & Moray, 1992; Riley, 1994). Thus, biases in self-conidence can have a substantial ef-
fect on the appropriate reliance on automation (Lee & See, 2004). That reliance may also be inlu-
enced by the degree of conidence one has in the automation and thus some research demonstrates 
that individuals can tend to over rely on automation (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010).
Automation bias, as it is termed, occurs when there is overconidence in the automation system. 
It has been deined by Mosier and Skitka (1996) as “a heuristic replacement for vigilant information 
seeking and processing” (p. 205). This tendency to over rely on automation can negatively impact on 
decision-making. For example, supervisors are likely to approve system decisions even when the 
system providing the information is unreliable (Cummings, 2004). Three main reasons for the 
occurrence of automation bias have been highlighted in the literature (Mosier & Skitka, 1996; 
Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). First, automation may be deemed less cognitively demanding thus 
being a preferred choice, as individuals tend to opt for the option of least efort (a cognitive miser 
efect—Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Second, individuals tend to overestimate of the correctness of 
automation viewing it as holding superior knowledge to that of their own. For instance, information 
from automated systems has been rated as more accurate than information provided by humans 
(Dijkstra, Liebrand, & Timminga, 1998), and supported by research which suggests those with more 
expertise are less likely to rely on automation (Sanchez, Rogers, Fisk, & Rovira, 2014). Third, individuals 
may view automation as a difusion of responsibility resulting in feeling less accountable for the 
decision (Latane & Darley, 1970). Indeed, Skitka, Mosier, and Burdick (2000) found that increasing 
accountability reduced instances of automation bias. Hence, as supervisors need to be able to 
correctly allocate between automated and manual functions (Ross et al., 2008) it would be beneicial 
to examine what factors inluence overconidence in automation.
It has been suggested that the efect of self-conidence and reliance on automation (i.e. increased 
conidence) can be moderated by both the skill level of the supervisor and risk associated with the 
decision to use or not to use automation (Riley, 1994). For instance, experience may impact on how 
much conidence is placed on a decision. Indeed, Riley, Lyall, and Weiner (1993) found that pilots 
rely on automation more than novices. Further, decision conidence may also depend on the danger 
or risk associated with the decision. However, research regarding whether individuals rely on auto-
mation more or less with increased risk is mixed. For example, when the risk is low individuals show 
more conidence in automation, but when the risk is high individuals tend not to rely on automation, 
suggesting a reduction in conidence in automation when greater risk is involved (Perkins, Miller, 
Hashemi, & Burns, 2010). However, Lyons and Stokes (2011), where supervisors were provided with 
the option to use either a human aid or automated tool for decision-making, found that in conditions 
of high risk the human aid was relied on less, demonstrating a preference to the automated aid in 
high risk circumstances. Hence, conidence in automation may well vary according to associated 
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risk. It is necessary therefore that both conidence in automated and manual decisions and self-
conidence of potential supervisors of automation be evaluated.
Currently, a wide range of individuals can legally operate a UAS. These range from professional 
pilots (e.g. Royal Air Force) to enlisted men (e.g. US Marine Corps) to private individuals (e.g. those 
who qualify for a UK Basic National UAS Certiicate (BNUC-S) which allows them to ly aircraft up to 
20 kg maximum take-of mass (MTOM) within visual line of sight (VLOS). Certiication can vary how-
ever depending upon classiication. For example, larger systems such as Predator/Reaper or Global 
Hawk require formal training courses in UAS operations, tactical and theatre operations, battlespace 
awareness, threats, weapons and sensors. Smaller systems tend to perform less complex missions 
and require less formal training. However, the tempo of UAS operations, at least for larger (generally 
military at the time of writing) vehicles has now outpaced current supervisor training regimes result-
ing in a shortage of qualiied UAS pilots. Surrogates need to be found to replace the use of manned 
aircraft pilots as UAS supervisors; preferably recruits who would learn faster and be easier to train, 
to accelerate supervisor training, to meet these new and pressing requirements (McKinley & McIntire, 
2009). Indeed, the US Air Force has adopted aptitude requirements and a training syllabus 
(Undergraduate RPA Training or URT) for UAS pilot trainees with little or no prior lying experience 
(see Carretta, 2013; Rose, Barron, Carretta, Arnold, & Howse, 2014).
Nevertheless, it is possible that the ground control stations of UASs can be compared to traditional 
video game environments. This comparison can be made in the sense that, in a video game, the 
player is trying to achieve some goal (the aircraft mission) and interacts with the game via screens 
and inceptors that provide suicient but limited information to allow this to happen (the aircraft 
sensor feed, displays and controllers). Thus, it is plausible to investigate whether video game experi-
ence and skills can be of particular beneit to UAS supervision. Indeed, video game players (VGP) who 
have no piloting experience may well be better suited to the role of UAS supervisor as these individu-
als will tend not to base aviation decisions on proprioceptive cues available to pilots of manned air-
craft (McKinley & McIntire, 2009). Plus, VGPs are argued to be able to track more targets (Castel, 
Pratt, & Drummond, 2005), have improved psychomotor skills (Gri th, Voloschin, Gibb, & Bailey, 
1983), quicker reaction times (Yuji, 1996) and enhanced spatial skills (Dorval & Pepin, 1986). 
Importantly, many studies have found the skills, abilities and other characteristics (SAOCs) of VGPs 
transfer to other cognitive tasks (Gopher, Weil, & Bareket, 1994; Green & Bavelier, 2007) but may not 
have the tactical and/or operational awareness.
McKinley and McIntire (2009) compared VGPs, professional pilots and a control group that had no 
gaming or pilot experience on UAS cognitive tasks. It was found that VGPs and professional pilots did 
not signiicantly difer but both were superior when compared to the control group in aircraft control 
and landing skills. These indings suggest that VGPs possess skills that have direct application to UAS 
supervision, and that VGPs and professional pilots possess some skills relevant to the supervision of 
UASs. However, more research is needed to consolidate these outcomes and across other measures. 
For example, it is important that self-conidence in decisions across decision-risk categories is as-
sociated with accurate responses made. This papers aims to assess these measures across a range 
of potential UAS supervisors.
In addition, and in order to identify suitable recruits for supervisory roles, it is beneicial to look at 
various typologies of potential agents. As noted, there has been some research which investigates 
the relationship diferent groups of potential supervisors have with the autonomous system operat-
ing the UAS with regard to levels of trust, what afects trust (Lee & See, 2004; Ruf et al., 2004) and 
abilities to efectively supervise a UAS (McKinley & McIntire, 2009). However, an extensive literature 
search has found a vacuum of research, focused on the supervisor, which is concerned with own 
supervisory levels of conidence and accuracy across potential UAS groups relative to decisions 
made. With this in mind, the present research focuses on four diferent groups of potential UAS su-
pervisors’ conidence and accuracy across risk decision, including some comparison to broad psy-
chological constructs. As Riley (1994) suggests, the four diferent groups distinguished by their skill 
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levels in aviation can have an impact on a supervisory conidence and accuracy. The four groups 
examined by this research are, (a) a control group; individuals with no gaming or pilot experience, (b) 
VGP; such individuals have been shown to possess cognitive abilities necessary for supervising a UAS, 
(c) private pilot; individuals who hold a private pilot’s licence and (d) professional pilot; individuals 
who are either instructors, commercial airline or military pilots.
The work here raises the notion that supervisor conidence is conceptually diferent to that work 
conducted on trust in this context; conidence here is a qualiier, which is associated with a particular 
decision. An individual who makes a decision associates this with a level of certainty (decision 
conidence) which arises as a result of speciic knowledge with the decision built on reasoning; it is 
not synonymous with trust which is largely based on intuitions (Muir, 1994; Shaw, 1997). This means 
an individual makes an evaluation of decisions and reports a level of conidence in those decisions 
that, ideally, correlate with correct performance (i.e. accuracy). Such a correlation is known as the 
within-subject conidence and accuracy (W-S C-A) relationship; measure of metacognitive sensitivity 
that enables the expression of individual conidence in correct or incorrect responses (Wheatcroft & 
Ellison, 2012; Wheatcroft & Woods, 2010; Yeung & Summerield, 2012). The measure assists the 
gauging of individual decision-making across a course of actions and so is very important where 
complexity may exist. Moreover, conidence has been related to decision success (i.e. increased 
accuracy; Bingi & Kasper, 1995), and overconidence in wrong decisions can result in inappropriate, 
perhaps fatal, action. Adidam and Bingi (2000) note that if an individual has more conidence in their 
decisions they tend to allocate more resources (i.e. cognitive ability) into implementing the decision; 
though this work cannot necessarily be generalised to aerial settings. Nevertheless, pilots may have 
greater metacognitive sensitivity (W-S C-A) to supervise a UAS than non-pilots because skill levels 
have been shown to positively afect conidence and accuracy (Riley, 1994). However, it has also 
been suggested that simulation training (i.e. playing video games) can increase conidence in 
decision-making (Atinaja-Faller, Quigley, Banichoo, Tsveybel, & Quigley, 2010) implying VGPs may 
also exhibit high W-S C-A. This research will determine which potential UAS supervisory group is 
most metacognitively conidence-accuracy sensitive, and moreover, across decision risk categories.
On the note of decision danger/risk, research has suggested the di culty of a decision task can 
inluence conidence and accuracy; the easier a task, the greater the concordance between coni-
dence and accuracy, and vice versa (Kebbell, Wagstaf, & Covey, 1996; Wheatcroft, Wagstaf, & 
Manarin, 2015). Decision di culty, in the context of UAS supervision, can be induced by varying the 
potential danger/risk of the decision needed to be made—relevant given that decisions carrying 
dangerous implication can be more di cult to make (Riley, 1994). Thus, decision danger/risk may 
reduce individual conidence and afect decision-making variably across the potential UAS groups; 
whilst overconidence can lead to risky (Krueger & Dickson, 1994); or inaccurate decisions 
(Wheatcroft, Wagstaf, & Kebbell, 2004). Potential thereby exists for groups to be highly conident 
and wrong.
Finally, it is also useful to explore personality typology of individuals across the potential groups as 
certain groups may respond in particular ways due to stable deep-seated predispositions (Chidester, 
Helmreich, Gregorich, & Geis, 1991). For example, those who have higher levels of ambiguity toler-
ance are more decisive and display greater conidence in choices (Ghosh & Ray, 1997; Maddux & 
Volkmann, 2010). The NEO-PIR is a general measure of ive factors of personality (i.e. neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness to experiences, agreeableness and conscientiousness; Costa & McCrae, 
1992; McCrae, & Costa, 1992). Measures of conscientiousness, openness to experience and agreea-
bleness from the NEO-PIR have been shown to be positively related to pilot performance of manned 
aircraft (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Burke, 1995; Chidester, Kanki, Foushee, Dickinson, & Bowles, 1990; 
Siem & Murray, 1994) but as yet no work has considered these factors in a UAS context, as described, 
nor across group type. Research suggests that the ive factors of the NEO-PIR have implication for 
aviation these may have importance to UAS decision conidence and accuracy.
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2. Rationale and aims
Potential UAS group supervisor’s conidence, accuracy and W-S C-A in decisions related to personal-
ity constructs, together with the examination of the impact of decision danger is of critical impor-
tance in this context; particularly as concordant conidence and accuracy is relevant to 
high-performance successful decisions and vice versa.
The current study therefore explores accuracy, conidence and W-S C-A relationship across groups 
(control, VGP, private, and professional pilots) to identify potential UAS supervisor’s levels on these 
measures and in relation to decision style. In addition, the decisions made will likely vary by the deci-
sion danger/risk to reveal the impact that increased danger has on decision conidence and accu-
racy. The varied decision danger is designed to induce decision di culty, which previous research 
has found to negatively impact conidence and accuracy (Kebbell et al., 1996; Wheatcroft et al., 
2015). The present study will also assess whether groups difer in decision conidence applied to 
manual decisions in comparison to automated decisions. Further, group personality traits will be 
assessed via standardised tools related to conidence, accuracy and W-S C-A. Insight into associa-
tions with measures will help to determine traits useful for UAS supervision.
In the light of the exploratory nature of some of the above, two key non-directional hypotheses 
were formulated: (i) levels of conidence, accuracy and W-S C-A will difer across groups and levels 
of decision danger; and (ii) psychometric tests will reveal personality characteristics that difer 
across groups and in relation to conidence, accuracy and the W-S C-A relationship.
Importantly, two key directional hypotheses were also expressed: (iii) as decision danger increas-
es, there will be a signiicant decrease in conidence, accuracy and W-S C-A across the groups; and 
(iv) decision conidence in automated and manual decisions will difer across groups and be nega-
tively impacted by increased decision danger.
3. Method
3.1. Participants
The sample consisted of four diferent groups (control, video game players (VGP), private, and pro-
fessional pilots) each made up of 15 participants (i.e. 60 participants in total; 51 male, 9 female). The 
minimum age of any participant was 17 as this is the minimum legal age a person can hold a pilot’s 
licence in the UK. There was no maximum age because holding a pilot license is determined by the 
ability to pass an appropriate medical (Civil Aviation Authority, 2010). The Control group consisted of 
participants with no gaming or pilot experience, recruited via the University of Liverpool (M = 39.4, 
SD = 18.8). The VGP group was recruited via the University of Liverpool (M = 21.7, SD = 2.9). The pri-
vate pilot licence group was recruited from lying clubs in North West England (M = 45.1, SD = 16.1). 
The professional pilot group was identiied in one of three ways by; (1) an airline transport pilots li-
cence (ATPL), (2) an instructor rating or (3) a military pilot recruited from various established lying 
institutions around North West England (M = 46, SD = 13.4). Opportunity sampling was employed. 
Any potential for representation bias and motivated responses was reduced by targeting a deined 
population and sample frame matched as keenly as possible. Participants responses were kept con-
idential and were only identiied by a number on their consent form and answer sheets.
3.2. Design
The independent variables are represented by the UAS interact groups and the level of potential 
danger of the decision (i.e. decision danger). The research is independently structured via a 4 (UAS 
Group: Control/VGP/Private Pilot/Professional Pilot) × 3 (Level of Decision: Low/Medium/High) design. 
The dependent variables are measured as conidence, accuracy, within-subjects conidence-accura-
cy (W-S C-A), correlation scores and psychometric scores.
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3.3. Materials
A set of demographic questions asked participant sex and age. A Tolerance of Ambiguity question-
naire was used to assess individual tolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1961) and Decision Style was 
used (Need for Closure; Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). The NEO-PIR is a ive-factor model of personality 
and consists of assessments of the major factors (i.e. Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to 
Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness). The NEO-PIR has strong support for reliability, 
construct and discriminant validity (see Costa & McCrae, 1992; Piedmont & Weinstein, 1993).
To provide the participants with as realistic a scenario as possible to allow them to make decisions, 
a series of pre-recorded video vignettes of typical scenarios that might be encountered during a typi-
cal light were recorded. To ensure ecological validity, this environment was modelled such that it 
contained information and displays that are typical of current UAS supervisory environments, with 
additional display elements to convey decisions being made by the Executive Agent (see Webster, 
Cameron, Fisher, & Jump, 2014). The supervisor’s station information was displayed on a visual 
screen with four individual display units that showed:
(1)  An external view of the simulated (virtual) outside world. This emulated the view from a for-
ward-looking camera mounted on the UAS in a good visual environment.
(2)  A moving map display. This showed a real-time indication of the UASs world plan-position and 
the current route planned by the Executive Agent.
(3)  The “Basic Six” light instruments. These instruments provide pilots of manned aircraft with the 
essential information required to conduct a light. They are arranged in a standard conigura-
tion of 2 rows × 3 columns. The irst row, moving left-to-right comprises: air speed indicator 
(ASI); attitude direction indicator (ADI) and altimeter. The second row moving left-to-right 
comprises: turn and slip indicator; horizontal situation indicator (HSI) and vertical speed indi-
cator (VSI).
(4)  The Aircraft Information Panel. Removing the pilot form the aircraft deprives the aircraft of a 
useful sensory system but also deprives the pilot of a number of valuable sensory cues that 
can be used to make decisions (engine noise, vibration etc.). This panel provided some limited 
information on the state of the aircraft (control surface positions, fuel remaining etc.) plus in-
formation concerning the communication status between the aircraft’s Executive Agent and 
the relevant air traic control (ATC) station. A number of these information messages were 
colour-coded to indicate the urgency with which they should be attended to (red = immediate 
action; orange = prepare to take action; green = no action required).
Figure 1 shows the standard set of screens used to create the vignette videos.
The aircraft light dynamics model was created using the multi-body dynamics software FLIGHTLAB 
[3] and was conigured to be representative of a small general-aviation trainer aircraft. A piece of 
code was written to make the outputs of this model drive the visualisation of the outside world using 
the Microsoft FSX gaming software as the display engine. The other three displays were generated 
using Presagis’ industry-standard VAPS (Virtual Avionics Prototyping Software) display creation soft-
ware, with an additional speciic piece of interface code being written to make the displays respond 
in the appropriate manner to the aircraft light dynamic model’s outputs. A Flight Brieing was drawn 
up to explain to participants what a UAS is, the overall mission of the light, the goals of safety and 
performance, the capabilities and constraints of a UAS, and the standard operational procedures in 
aviation. An event and decision log was developed and the strongest answer for all 21 decisions was 
identiied and veriied by two UAS pilot experts (Cronbach’s Alpha = 1). The light was separated into 
seven phases: taxy (the air vehicle manoeuvres on the ground to reach the runway threshold); take 
of (the air vehicle manoeuvres on the ground to line-up with the runway centre-line, accelerates to 
a particular speed, rotates and becomes airborne); climb out (the vehicle achieves the desired climb 
attitude, heading and speed and continues in this mode until the desired cruise altitude s reached); 
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cruise (the vehicle achieves the straight and level light attitude and speed and follows heading au-
topilot commands to follow the pre-planned route); descent (in the vicinity of the destination airport, 
the vehicle begins a descent from the cruise altitude to achieve and altitude and inertial position 
that is suitable to begin the approach to the runway); approach (the air vehicle achieves the desired 
approach speed and coniguration and lines up with the extended runway centre-line. It lies a 
heading such that it remains in this alignment and descends at an appropriate rate such that it is at 
approximately 50ft above ground level as it crosses the runway threshold); and landing (from the 
so-called 50ft “screen height”, the air vehicle rate of descent is reduced such that it comes into con-
tact with the runway surface at an acceptably low rate of descent). Each phase included three 
events that could occur across the light which varied in potential danger/risk (low, medium, high) of 
the decision. As such, there were 21 events that required a decision to be made to each. Every event 
had three options to choose from. There always existed the option to (a) allow the autonomous 
system to control the UAS and (b) to intervene and manually ly the vehicle. This increased the eco-
logical validity of the experiment because, as with ield operators, those supervisors taking part 
needed to balance the competing goals of safety and performance using automatic or manual con-
trol. The event and decision log provided a baseline measurement tool against which the research 
measurements (conidence, accuracy and W-S C-A) could be scored. Such methods and measures 
have been used successfully in previous research (Wheatcroft & Ellison, 2012; Wheatcroft & Woods, 
2010). A Likert scale (ranging from 1–not at all conident at all to 10–extremely conident) was used 
to record participant conidence in each of the decisions made.
Figure 1. Standard set of 
screens used to create the 
vignette videos.
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3.4. Procedure
The investigation was approved by the University of Liverpool ethics committee. Participants were 
assigned to the appropriate group as deined by the criteria. The experiment was conducted with 
mixed groups of no more than 20 participants being tested at any one time. Participants were seat-
ed separately from each other in front of a projector and instructed not to confer. Participants were 
then given the information sheet to read, asked if they had any questions and once satisied they 
had an understanding of the experiment signed the consent form to proceed. Participants irst com-
pleted the Demographic, Tolerance of Ambiguity, Decision Style and NEO-PIR questionnaires. All 
participants were given the opportunity to practise a short light to familiarise them to the require-
ments of the study. For the main experiment, participants were given the Flight Brieing to read and 
instructed to supervise a UAS on a civilian cargo light from A to B (Liverpool John Lennon International 
Airport to Blackpool International Airport) that was shown using the 33-min long vignette. This route 
was chosen as it was short enough to conduct the experiment several times whilst exposing the 
participants to, for example, several diferent kinds of airspace classiication and scenarios that 
might be representative of a longer duration light. During the light procedure, 21 events required 
the participant to make a key decision. As each event arose, the light was paused and the partici-
pants had 45 s to choose from one of the three options presented to them. They had to select the 
one which they believed to be the best decision that met the terms of the brieing and then rate how 
conident they were in that decision. The simulation attempted as far as possible to mirror the con-
text of decision-making required in this setting. Once the decision-making time had elapsed, the 
light sequence was re-started from the paused condition until the next event occurred. This process 
was repeated until the light had come to an end. Once completed participants were debriefed fully 
to ensure they knew what they had taken part in and given the opportunity to ask questions and 
reminded of their right to withdraw data anytime. Ethical protocols were followed at all stages dur-
ing the study.
4. Results
Participants’ psychometric test scores, overall accuracy (i.e. the number of decisions made correctly) 
and conidence scores for the event and decision logs were calculated.
4.1. Psychometric data
First, one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the psychometric data to assess and compare each 
group on the psychometric measures (see Table 1).
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of psychometric measures across UAS group
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
*p < .05.
Psychometric UAS group
Control VGP Private pilot Professional pilot
Ambiguity tolerance A 50.13 (5.22) 49.13 (6.69) 48.60 (9.36) 48.13 (6.65)
Decision style 56.93 (11.42) 54.60 (10.49) 55.40 (7.82) 48.93 (8.62)
Ambiguity tolerance B 35.67 (6.76) 33.87 (5.72) 35.27 (4.65) 31.73 (5.66)
Decisiveness 21.27 (5.39) 20.73 (5.61) 20.13 (4.16) 17.20 (3.71)
Neuroticism 23.20* (8.69) 19.67 (6.47) 20.87 (8.13) 15.40* (4.84)
Extraversion 29.53 (8.23) 33.00 (6.61) 28.47 (5.73) 31.80 (6.34)
Open to experiences 32.80 (6.84) 29.60 (7.04) 28.80 (5.85) 28.73 (5.70)
Agreeableness 30.07 (5.41) 28.13* (4.93) 30.07 (5.01) 33.80* (5.62)
Conscientiousness 32.33 (6.60) 31.00 (4.75) 33.07 (7.05) 36.67 (4.75)
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There was a signiicant efect for neuroticism, F(3, 56) = 3.10, p = .034, p < .05, and agreeableness, 
F(3, 56) = 3.06, p = .035, p < .05. Neuroticism was lower for professional pilots (M = 15.40, SD = 4.84) 
than for controls (M = 23.20, SD = 8.69), p = .022, p < .05. No other comparisons were found to be 
signiicant for neuroticism (p > .05). Agreeableness however was higher for professional pilots 
(M = 33.80, SD = 5.62) compared to VGPs (M = 28.13, SD = 4.93), p = .023, p < .05. No other compari-
sons for agreeableness were signiicant (p > .05). No other efects were observed, for example, for 
tolerance of ambiguity A F(3, 56) = .22, p > .05; decision style F(3, 56) = 1.95, p > .05; tolerance of 
ambiguity B F(3, 56) = 1.43, p > .05; decisiveness F(3, 56) = 2.16, p > .05; extraversion F(3, 56) = 1.39, 
p > .05, openness to experiences F(3, 56) = 1.36, p > .05 and conscientiousness F(3, 56) = 2.55, 
p > .05.
In order to establish if the psychometric scores were related to the accuracy, conidence and W-S 
C-A Pearson’s correlations were performed. No signiicant relationships between the psychometric 
data and accuracy were found (p > .05).
There was however a signiicant moderate negative relationship shown between neuroticism and 
conidence (r = −.415, p = .000, p < .001); as neuroticism increases conidence decreases. A signii-
cant moderate positive relationship between conscientiousness and conidence (r = .374, p = .003, 
p < .01) was also found; as conscientiousness increases, so does conidence. Further, a signiicant 
weak negative relationship between tolerance of ambiguity A and W-S C-A was found (r = −.300, 
p = .019, p < .02); as tolerance of ambiguity A score decreases (i.e. greater tolerance to ambiguity) 
the W-S C-A relationship increases.
4.2. Accuracy data
As above a 4 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the data to analyse the efect of 
decision danger and UAS group on accuracy (see Table 2).
A 4 (UAS Group: control/VGP/private pilot/professional pilot) × 3 (Decision Danger: Low/Medium/
High) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to analyse the efect of decision danger and UAS 
group on accuracy.
A main efect of decision danger on accuracy was observed, F(2, 112) = 13.66, p = .000, p < .001; 
휂
2
p
 = .20. F comparisons showed accuracy was higher for low (M = 5.10, SD = 1.41) than for high 
(M = 4.32, SD = 1.59) decision danger, p = .000, p < .001. Accuracy was also higher for medium 
(M = 5.33, SD = 1.00) than for high (M = 4.32, SD = 1.59) decision danger, p = .000, p < .001. However, 
no diference was observed between low and medium decision danger accuracy, p = .230, p > .05.
There was no main efect of UAS group on accuracy, F(3, 36) = 1.14, p = .240, p > .05, and no inter-
action of decision danger and group was observed, F(6, 112) = 1.13, p = .349, p > .05.
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for overall accuracy and decision danger accuracy
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
**p < .001.
UAS group Accuracy and decision danger (DD) 
Overall accuracy Low DD Medium DD High DD
Control 13.47 (3.83) 4.27 (1.83) 5.20 (1.15) 4.13 (1.69)
VGP 14.80 (2.15) 5.40 (.83) 5.20 (.862) 4.13 (1.55)
Private pilot 15.20 (3.41) 5.27 (1.44) 5.60 (1.24) 4.33 (1.80)
Professional pilot 15.67 (2.50) 5.47 (1.13) 5.33 (.72) 4.67 (1.40)
Total 14.78 (3.08) 5.10** (1.41) 5.33** (1.00) 4.32** (1.59)
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4.3. Confidence data
As before, a 4 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA was performed to examine the efect of decision dan-
ger and UAS group on conidence (see Table 3).
There was a main efect of decision danger on conidence F(2, 112) = 22.47, p = .000 p < .001; 
휂
2
p
 = .29. F comparisons showed conidence was higher for low (M = 56.55, SD = 9.55) than for high 
(M = 52.37, SD = 9.88) decision danger, p = .000, p < .001. Conidence was also higher for medium 
(M = 55.98, SD = 8.89) as opposed to high (M = 52.37, SD = 9.88) decision danger, p = .000, p < .001. 
No diference existed between low and medium decision danger conidence, p = .308, p > .05.
A main efect of UAS group was found for conidence F(3, 56) = 5.48, p = .018, p < .02; 휂2
p
 = .28. 
F comparisons showed conidence was higher for professional pilots (M = 180.47, SD = 18.24) than 
for controls (M = 147.27, SD = 33.66), p = .017, p < .02. Conidence was also higher for VGP’s 
(M = 172.53, SD = 24.72) than for controls (M = 147.27, SD = 33.66), p = .031, p < .05. No other com-
parisons were found to be signiicant for overall conidence (p > .05).
No interaction was observed between decision danger and interact UAS group on conidence 
F(6, 112) = 1.40, p = .237, p > .05.
4.4. W-S C-A data
To establish if there were any signiicant efects of UAS group (control, VGP, private pilot, profes-
sional pilot) and level of decision danger (low, medium and high) for within-subjects conidence and 
accuracy (W-S C-A) correlations, it was irst necessary to calculate each individual participant’s W-S 
C-A score. The answer to each question was coded as correct or incorrect, and the conidence score 
for each question was recorded to generate a numerical relationship between conidence and ac-
curacy for each participant (i.e. a point-biserial correlation). Table 4 illustrates.
Table 3. Means and standard deviations for overall confidence and decision danger confidence
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
*p < .05.
**p < .02.
***p < .001.
UAS group Confidence and decision danger (DD) 
Overall confidence Low DD Medium DD High DD
Control 147.27** (33.66) 48.93 (11.30) 51.33 (11.90) 47.00 (11.74)
VGP 172.53* (24.72) 59.53 (8.24) 58.60 (7.83) 54.40 (9.70)
Private pilot 159.33 (16.35) 54.93 (6.23) 53.60 (5.54) 50.80 (6.13)
Professional pilot 180.47** (18.24) 62.80 (5.80) 60.40 (6.50) 57.27 (8.85)
Total 164.90 (26.83) 56.55*** (9.55) 55.98*** (8.89) 52.37*** (9.88)
Table 4. Means and standard deviations for overall W-S C-A and decision danger W-S C-A
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
*p < .05.
**p < .001.
UAS group W-S C-A and decision danger (DD)
Overall WS-CA Low DD Medium DD High DD
Control .23 (.20) .34 (.38) .19 (.53) −.10 (.41)
VGP .30 (.31) .21 (.53) .22 (.46) .27 (.47)
Private pilot .34 (.18) .48 (.40) .24 (.39) .09 (.54)
Professional pilot .26 (.27) .57 (.40) .27 (.45) .04 (.38)
Total .29 (.24) .40** (.44) .23* (.45) .07** (.46)
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A further 4 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to analyse the efect of decision danger 
and UAS group on W-S C-A.
There was a main efect of decision danger on W-S C-A, F(2, 112) = 7.96, p = .016, p < .02; 휂2
p
 = .12. 
F comparisons showed W-S C-A was highest for low (M = .40, SD = .44) than for high (M = .07, 
SD = .46) decision danger, p = .000, p < .001 and W-S C-A was also higher for medium (M = .23, 
SD = .45) than for high (M = .07, SD = .46) decision danger, p = .040, p < .05. However, no diference 
was found between medium and low decision danger, p = .068, p > .05.
There was no main efect of UAS group on W-S C-A, F(3, 56) = .99, p = .405, p > .05, nor was there 
any interaction of decision danger and UAS group observed, F(6, 112) = 1.33, p = .249, p > .05.
4.5. Between-subjects confidence-accuracy (B-S C-A)
In order to establish if conidence scores related to accuracy scores, a between-subjects Pearson’s 
correlation was also conducted. A signiicant weak positive correlation was observed between con-
idence and accuracy (r = .272, p = .035, p < .05).
4.6. Decision type: Manual vs. automated data
One-way ANOVAs were conducted on decision conidence in manual and automated decisions for 
both high and low decision danger levels to assess diferences between the groups (control, VGP, 
private pilots, professional pilots; see Table 5).
4.6.1. Manual choice-low decision danger
Signiicant diferences were found between the groups in reported decision conidence in manual 
decisions made in conditions of low decision danger F(3, 56) = 11.385, p = .000, p < .001. Post hoc 
tests found that the VGP group (M = 18.5, SD = 2.1) was signiicantly more conident in their manual 
decisions than the control (M = 14.3, SD = 3.2), p = .000, p < .001. The professional pilot group 
(M = 19.2, SD = 1.1) was also signiicantly more conident in their decisions than the control (M = 14.3, 
SD = 3.2), p = .000, p < .001, and private pilots (M = 16.8, SD = 2.9), p = .035, p < .05. No other com-
parisons were signiicant.
4.6.2. Manual choice-high decision danger
Signiicant diferences were found between groups in conditions of high decision danger and deci-
sion conidence in manual decisions, F(3, 56) = 5.841, p = .002, p < .01. F tests showed that profes-
sional pilots (M = 17.4, SD = 2.8) were signiicantly more conident than the control (M = 12.1, 
SD = 4.8), p = .000, p < .001, and as compared with private pilots (M = 14.4, SD = 2.3), p = .016, p < .02. 
No other comparisons were signiicant.
4.6.3. Automated choice-low decision danger
Similarly to manual decision there were signiicant diferences found between groups in their reported 
decision conidence in automated decision choices in low decision danger conditions F(3, 56) = 5.086, 
p = .004, p < .01. Post analysis found that professional pilots (M = 43.6, SD = 5.0) were more conident 
in automated decisions in low decision danger than both control (M = 34.6, SD = 8.5), p = .009, p < .01 
and private pilots (M = 38.1, SD = 4.4), p = .019, p < .02. No other comparisons were signiicant.
Table 5. Means and standard deviations for decision confidence of decision danger and 
decision choice
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
Decision 
danger (DD)
Decision 
choice (DC)
Control VGP Private Professional Total
Low Manual 14.33 (3.24) 18.47 (2.10) 16.80 (2.88) 19.20 (1.15) 17.20 (3.06)
High Manual 12.07 (4.82) 15.60 (3.91) 14.40 (2.26) 17.40 (2.79) 14.87 (4.00)
Low Automatic 34.60 (8.54) 40.40 (7.19) 38.13 (4.42) 43.60 (5.03) 39.18 (7.15)
High Automatic 34.93 (8.47) 38.80 (7.13) 36.40 (5.12) 39.87 (8.00) 37.50 (7.37)
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4.6.4. Automated choice-high decision danger
No efects were observed for conidence in automated decision choices in conditions of high decision 
danger, F(3, 56) = 1.417, p = .247, p > .05.
To investigate conidence across manual and automated decisions overall (regardless of group), a 
series of paired t-tests were conducted (see Table 6).
First, data were analysed to examine if decision conidence difered in high and low decision dan-
ger in automated and manual decisions. A Bonferroni correction was applied, p < .01.
For automated decisions, participants were more conident in low decision danger (M = 39.18, 
SD = 7.15) than high decision danger (M = 37.50, SD = 7.37), t(59) = 2.402, p = .019, p < .02. However, 
this was not signiicant once the correction had been applied. For manual decisions however partici-
pants were more conident, despite the correction, in those decisions classed as low decision danger 
(M = 17.20, SD = 3.06) than high danger (M = 14.87, SD = 4.00), t(59) = 5.633, p = .000, p < .001.
In conditions of low decision danger participants applied higher conidence ratings in the deci-
sions that involved use of the autonomous system (M = 39.18, SD = 7.15) than manual decisions to 
intervene (M = 17.20, SD = 3.06), t(59) = −31.401, p = .000, p < .001. Similarly in high decision danger 
conditions participants were more conident in their decision when agreeing with the autonomous 
system (M = 37.50, SD = 7.37) compared to manual choice (M = 14.87, SD = 4.00), t(59) = −26.699, 
p = .000, p < .001.
When collapsing the level of decision danger the results showed that participants were, overall, 
signiicantly more conident in autonomous system decisions (M = 38.34, SD = 6.74) as compared 
with manual override decisions (M = 16.34, SD = 3.54), t(59) = −35.358, p = .000, p < .001.
5. Discussion
This study investigated accuracy, conidence and within-subjects conidence-accuracy (W-S C-A) 
relationships across UAS groups (control, VGPs, private and professional pilots) to identify potential 
UAS supervisor level on factors relevant to decisions made where that danger/risk was manipulated 
and options to manually intervene or allow the autonomous systems to control the UAS were pro-
vided. Personality constructs were also considered.
5.1. Confidence
As predicted the groups difered signiicantly in decision conidence. It was found that professional 
pilots and VGPs showed signiicantly higher conidence compared to the control group. One reason 
for the greater conidence of these two groups may well be explained by the impact of prior experi-
ence, training and familiarity that both professional pilots and VGPs have with mission-based tasks 
which involve split-second reactive decisions and that have implication in the real or virtual world. 
Indeed, it has been shown that experience and training, including simulation, such as playing video 
games, can result in increased decision conidence (Atinaja-Faller et al., 2010; Chung & Monroe, 
Table 6. Means and standard deviations for decision confidence in decision danger and 
decision choice
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
Decision 
danger (DD)
Decision 
choice (DC)
Mean (SD) Decision 
danger (DD)
Decision 
choice (DC)
Mean (SD)
High Manual 14.87 (4.00) High Automatic 37.50 (7.37)
Low Manual 17.20 (3.06) Low Automatic 39.18 (7.15)
Total manual 16.34 (3.54) Total automatic 38.34 (6.74)
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2000; Payne et al., 2002) and that familiarity can also result in increased decision conidence by ena-
bling the illusion that individuals are accurately remembering important detail (Chandler, 1994).
Although not signiicant, the direction of the indings support the possibility that professional pi-
lots show greater levels of conidence because they are used to the possibility of reality danger 
(M = 180.47), whereas VGPs are operating within virtual danger (M = 172.53). As professional pilots 
frequently make aviation decisions that have potential for major implication across all aspects of 
professional, private and the lives of others they thereby exhibit more conidence in such decisions. 
Conversely, private pilots, for example, do not ly as a career and are not used to the added stress of 
these types of issues which may be expressed in conidence levels. The study thus lends some sup-
port to previous work (Chung & Monroe, 2000; Kebbell et al., 1996) which shows, for example, as dif-
iculty increases conidence would be expected to decrease. In turn, this may suggest that high 
danger levels can lead to problematic decision-making.
Furthermore, it is an interesting observation that professional pilots do exhibit more conidence 
across the decision dangers than do private pilots again supporting the idea that experience, train-
ing and familiarity in dealing with high impact decisions will efectively increase individual coni-
dence. However, conidence without experience, training and relevant knowledge can be regarded 
as overconidence. In fact, research suggests that when complex tasks are unfamiliar such overcon-
idence relative to accurate decision-making can occur (Wheatcroft et al., 2004). Professionals not 
only have experience but are highly regarded and relied upon for their expertise; though it is neces-
sary that the professional label is coupled with necessary training, particularly as it has been sug-
gested that conidence can positively afect risk taking behaviour (Krueger & Dickson, 1994). One can 
then be more conident that a decision made with high conidence will more likely be accurate.
5.2. Confidence in decision type: Manual vs. automated
A UAS supervisory role involves the allocation of functions between automated and manual which 
impact on how the system performs (Lee & Moray, 1992) hence, supervisors need to be able to apply 
the correct amount of conidence to decisions to both automated and those which require interven-
tion. In this study, participants were always provided with the decision option to allow the autono-
mous system to control the UAS or to intervene and manually ly the vehicle and conidence ratings 
from both these decision types were obtained. Data were analysed to assess whether groups would 
difer in how much conidence was applied to manual decisions in comparison to automated deci-
sions and vice versa as a function of diferent levels of decision danger.
The results demonstrate support for the hypothesis that conidence in decisions to automate and 
manually intervene will difer between groups. Professional pilots were more conident in manual 
decisions in both high and low decision danger and automated decisions in low decision danger 
levels. Similarly to overall conidence, experience may be able to explain this inding, as professional 
pilots are more likely to have experience making both manual decisions and also using autonomous 
systems compared to other groups, therefore displaying higher levels of conidence in those deci-
sions. Research has shown that pilots tend to rely more on automation in comparison to student 
populations (Riley et al., 1993), which would explain elevated conidence in automated decisions. 
Thus, it seems that experience may increase conidence in both automated and manual decisions.
However, what is interesting to note is that no signiicant diference was found between groups in 
conidence of automated decisions in conditions of high decision danger. This would demonstrate 
that all groups displayed similar levels of conidence in those decisions in these conditions, providing 
further support to the idea that increases in decision danger does impact on conidence and is most 
evident in decisions to allow autonomous control the UAS.
Further analysis examined the data collapsed across all groups. Supervisors were signiicantly 
more conident in decisions in low danger than high decision danger and this occurred in both auto-
mated and manual decisions. Conditions of high decision danger were characterised as 
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encompassing more risk, consequently increasing decision complexity. In these conditions, it was 
found that decision conidence in choice to use automation was reduced in comparison to decisions 
made in low decision danger. Hence, individuals felt less conident in decisions made by the UAS 
when in conditions of increased risk and complexity. Such a inding lends support to previous re-
search which showed in conditions of high risk automation is relied on less (Lyons & Stokes, 2011), 
as supervisors tend to display less conidence in the decision. Whilst in this study for manual deci-
sions, danger increased conidence.
All groups tended to place a higher degree of conidence in a decision when they chose to let the 
autonomous system control the UAS. This was observed to occur in both high and low decision dan-
ger and regardless of decision danger level in the collapsed data. As mentioned, conidence scores 
do not necessarily relate to accuracy therefore these indings could demonstrate a tendency for 
supervisors to be overconident in decisions made by autonomous systems, providing some support 
for automation bias (Mosier & Skitka, 1996). The idea that supervisors believe decisions made by 
automation have superior knowledge and consequently more conidence is placed in that decision 
is not new (Dijkstra et al., 1998). The concept is further supported by the reduced conidence shown 
in manual decisions in this study; contrasting previous research which argues manual decisions are 
preferred (de Vries, Midden, & Bouwhuis, 2003; Lee & Moray, 1992).
Although it can be argued that conidence in automation is beneicial in that it reduces workload 
(Parasuraman, Cosenzo, & de Visser, 2009) overconidence can also cause operators not to attend to 
conlicting data (Cummings, 2004) and ignore erroneous decisions (Mosier, Palmer, & Degani, 1992). 
Hence, it is imperative that supervisors are able to correctly discriminate between incorrect and cor-
rect autonomous decisions and place the appropriate conidence in the actual decisions taken.
5.3. W-S C-A (and B-S C-A)
Conidence, while very important, represents overconidence if it is not correlated in the appropriate 
direction with accuracy decisions. It is imperative then, when a supervisor exhibits a high level of 
conidence that a positive relationship exists between their assessment and the accuracy of 
response. That is to say: the greater conidence a supervisor expresses in their decision the more 
accurate those answers should be. However, whilst correlation is necessary it is not a suicient 
condition for causality. The supervisor may have more conidence in their decisions because they 
have learned through past experience that their decisions have high accuracy under similar 
conditions.
There was no group efect for W-S C-A. This suggests the metacognitive measure, as one might 
expect, requires a diferent skill set not necessarily aforded by past experience. Thus group mem-
bership does not signiicantly improve individual awareness of the accuracy or inaccuracy of judge-
ments made (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 2006). However, there was a main efect of decision danger; largely, 
when decision danger was high W-S C-A signiicantly decreased. This inding validates the categori-
sation of decision danger and reinforces that decisions which carry dangerous implication are hard-
er to assess, judge and therefore make. A closer examination of the means showed that, although 
no interaction was observed, VGPs W-S C-A remained relatively constant across the three decision 
danger categories and were able to produce the highest W-S C-A in the most di cult category. In 
comparison, other groups achieved roughly no correlation or one which was negative (i.e. control) 
for the same category. To be able to maintain positive W-S C-A levels for high decision dangers is 
crucial as these decisions are considered critical junctures at which things could go wrong. The ob-
servation that VGPs produce the highest correlation between conidence and accuracy for risk sug-
gests that VGPs may be a good resource for UAS supervision, as, according to the indings here, this 
group are able to show the best awareness of the accuracy or inaccuracy of their decisions, particu-
larly those characterised by high danger and avoidance of overconident ratings. However, a per-
son’s accuracy for risk assessment and making the correct decisions is a key indicator of suitability 
for UAS operations—as conidence could improve with experience. There was a signiicant positive 
relationship between conidence and accuracy (B-S C-A).
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5.4. Accuracy
The groups did not difer in the accuracy of decisions. It is however plausible this outcome could 
have been observed given the standardisation of the study. Groups however were separated by their 
experiences and the inding that groups made reasonably equivalent decisions in terms of accuracy 
lends support to the Chung and Monroe (2000) inding that experience has no efect on accuracy. 
Indeed, Boot, Kramer, Simons, Fabiani, and Gratton (2008) suggest that any improved performance 
seen in video game players compared to non-players may either be due to practice in honing cogni-
tive skills through the act of playing video games, or could be a result of self-selection to pursue 
video game playing given pre-existing skills. Video game players may have the capacity to develop 
relevant UAS skills through practice or may inherently possess the skills which drew them to game 
playing. However, the indings here do not support that view. Accuracy can be seen as a measure of 
not only whether the group members accurately identiied the optimal response but also whether a 
supervisor allows for automatic control or takes control manually. The accuracy score can provide 
some insight into whether supervisor trust is appropriate to UAS capability. It could be said that as 
decision danger increases accuracy decreases and that supervisor trust is negatively afected and 
thereby inappropriate. For example, either misuse (i.e. using automation for more than it should be 
used for—the danger is too high so individual allows automation to make the decision/carry out ac-
tion), or disuse (i.e. using manual control unnecessarily—the danger is considered too great to trust 
the automation so individual is more conident in own ability) can occur more readily under such 
conditions. Of course, this suggestion would require further investigation. What can be said is that 
given the best information and learning experience the role of UAS supervisor is within the scope of 
non-pilot trained individuals; while the role requires new skill sets and aviation experience may pro-
vide some slight advantage it was certainly not found to be a signiicant factor here.
Broadly speaking, for decision danger the hypotheses were largely supported; accuracy, coni-
dence and W-S C-A relationships reduced signiicantly as decision danger increased. The simple ex-
ception to this was that no diferences were observed between low and medium decision danger for 
accuracy, conidence or W-S C-A. Therefore, a constant feature was that high decision danger im-
pacted negatively on and across the accuracy, conidence and W-S C-A measures. It also had a role 
to play in the conidence expressed when choosing to intervene or rely on automation.
5.5. Personality constructs
It was predicted that the measured characteristics would difer across the groups and in part this 
was supported. Professional pilots scored lower for neuroticism than the control group which sug-
gests the professional pilot group are more likely to address problems in an emotionally stable, calm, 
even-tempered and relaxed manner, and would be better equipped to cope with the stresses in-
volved. Given the crew-context professional pilots work in they are much more likely to express 
these characteristics in an altruistic fashion where successful task completion takes priority. 
Moreover, the professional pilot group scored signiicantly higher on agreeableness than VGPs; indi-
cating the latter would be more prone to competitiveness rather than helpfulness.
Of note is that, overall, neuroticism was negatively related to conidence; thus, those individuals 
who score highly on this construct would be less able to control impulses and be susceptible to ir-
rational thoughts and/or behaviour—which may well increase in intensity under stress. Neuroticism 
construct screening for professional pilots is thereby very informative as inability to cope with stress 
can inhibit problem-solving, increase anxiety and make for less conident decisions (Michie, 2002). 
Further, the inding that professional pilots express signiicantly higher levels of conidence perhaps 
supports this idea; though the authors remain mindful that this higher level of conidence was not 
always relected in accurate responses, particularly for decisions classiied as high danger (see W-S 
C-A). Nonetheless, these indings suggest an advantage in selection of individuals for training who 
score low on neuroticism as it can be considered vital for conidence in critical decision-making.
Correlational analysis, across all participant groups, showed that conscientiousness was positively 
related to conidence. The more planning, organisation and task focus an individual has means they 
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are likely to express increased conidence; in this case in decisions made. It suggests that conscien-
tiousness is a desirable trait that UAS supervisors should hold to exhibit increased decision coni-
dence. Researchers have considered aptitude tests (Carretta, Rose, & Barron, 2015) and the utility of 
personality (Chappelle, McDonald, Heaton, Thompson, & Haynes, 2012) in the US Air Force, with the 
suggestion that other measures to supplement the current arrangements would be helpful.
What is as important is whether a relationship exists between conidence and accurate decisions. 
Here, intolerance of ambiguity (A) was negatively related to W-S C-A. In this case, lower levels of 
tolerance of ambiguity (A) means one expresses greater tolerance to ambiguous contexts and tasks. 
Aviation is characterised by the need to make critical and potentially irreversible decisions during 
light without the beneit of discussion and timed relection. Therefore, greater tolerance of these 
kinds of situations is psychologically advantageous in that individuals can make conident and ac-
curate decisions without the undue negative efects dissonance can bring. It follows that intolerant 
individuals would feel uncomfortable and be motivated to reduce this by making a decision inhibited 
by lowered conidence and inability to accurately judge correctness. As such, individuals who have a 
greater tolerance to ambiguity will show increased W-S C-A relationships and is thereby an impor-
tant resource in the role of UAS supervision illustrating the importance of greater sensitivity in the 
assessment of eicacious decision-making. The W-S C-A correlation afords a start point for meta-
cognitive measurement in this context.
Of course, the participants knew the decisions had little real-life implication and thus the outcomes 
are generalisable only in this context. Despite this limitation the study attempted to maintain high 
verisimilitude as the simulation equipment was modelled on a UAS supervisory environment which 
incorporated the known requirements of supervisory control. Further the W-S C-A measure has been 
applied successfully in diferent contexts (Wheatcroft & Ellison, 2012; Wheatcroft & Woods, 2010). 
There are however traits other than those studied here that may be relevant to accuracy (Szalma & 
Taylor, 2011), conidence and decision-making in this important human machine interface.
It would therefore be beneicial to conduct further research into the impact of conditions contain-
ing even greater ecological validity. One way might be to instruct one group that they are indeed 
monitoring a UAS. Further, while this study was able to verify response accuracy against UAS super-
visor expert decision logs there is scope to systematically increase the di culty and complexity of 
events and to measure multiple decisions and/or sources of information. Indeed, the complexity of 
the factors and efects involved suggest that for any selection tools to be efective the optimal pro-
iles would need to be developed separately for each level, type and so on (Szalma & Taylor, 2011). 
Latency to decisions could also be important to measure across groups and environments. Moreover, 
other groups (i.e. air traic controllers who have experience of supervising multiples of aircraft) and 
group age may also be assessed.
The study adds to current literature which has the goal of developing ways of identifying and se-
lecting appropriate personnel for speciic tasks in this context. One might argue that focusing on 
SAOCs rather than speciic VGP experience would result in a larger pool but this is yet to be 
established.
6. Conclusion
The Civil Aviation Authority (2012) recognises there is currently no approved training course for UAS 
supervisory role for vehicles above 20 kg MTOM. It does however express the view that a UAS super-
visor need not have manned aircraft pilot experience in the recognition that a supervisor may re-
quire alternative skill sets. The indings here give ground to the idea that VGPs could be considered 
as a resource; indeed, VGPs display constant W-S C-A across decision danger categorisations. VGPs 
exhibit some skills that may be required in successful UAS supervision, particularly as they are least 
likely to exhibit overconidence in decision judgements. All groups displayed an increase in decision 
conidence in automated decisions which can be problematic when unmatched against decision 
accuracy. Personality constructs measured suggest operators be selected for low neuroticism, high 
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conscientiousness and tolerance to ambiguous contexts. It is important to note that for supervisors 
to appropriately increase decision conidence, the experience gained, in training, familiarity (simu-
lated or real), in mission-based tasks and time-limited decisions involving criticality will most likely 
be required to be updated as part of continuous personal development.
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